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Abstract   Since 1983 the Northern European anglerfish fishery, exploited by
fleets of seven countries, has been regulated using a policy of Total Allowable
Catch (TAC). In this paper, the strategy followed by the European Union (EU) in
distributing the established TAC among the seven countries is explored. It is in-
ferred that the EU has utilized a weighted proportional rule, taking the average
catches for the period l973–78 as the reference point. On the other hand, given
that the fishery situation for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 can be character-
ized as a bankruptcy problem, this paper also explores, as possible means of
enriching the Common European Fishery policy, alternatives to this rule. This
work proposes the application of two additional rules derived from game theory,
the nucleolus and the Shapley value, and studies their properties. The analysis
suggests that it may be worth considering not only the proportional distribution,
but also the alternative rules.
Key words   Fishing regulation, bankruptcy problem, Shapley value, nucleolus,
proportional rule.
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Introduction
One important consideration in the regulation of a fishery is the distribution of a To-
tal Allowable Catch (TAC) among the different countries that are exploiting the spe-
cies under control. This paper analyzes this issue on the Northern European angler-
fish fishery in detail. The choice of this case study was based on several points.
The first motivating factor was the availability of detailed data. It was possible
to obtain valuable information on the distribution of TAC among the countries ex-
ploiting the Northern European anglerfish fishery. This information allowed to infer
the rule used by the EU in distributing the TAC. The sample has also shown the un-
fair treatment suffered by some of the countries involved.
The second motivation was that the size of the sample (which involves just
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seven countries) provided the opportunity to compare and contrast the traditional
proportional rule with two of the rules most frequently studied in theoretical coop-
erative game literature: the Shapley value and the nucleolus. See Kaitala and
Lindroos (1998) and Li (1999) for other applications of cooperative game theory to
fishing problems.
Finally, given that the European Common Fishery Policy will soon be renewed,
the considerations suggested in this paper could be useful for such a revision.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section looks, in detail, at the
current state and management of the Northern European anglerfish fishery. The third
section explores how the current quotas are allocated within the fishery. This is then
followed, in the fourth section, by a formal representation of the fishing bankruptcy
problem and three potential solutions: the proportional rule, the nucleolus, and the
Shapley value. Included within this discussion is the analysis of the key desirable
properties that any rule applied to this context should fulfill. The fifth section shows
the application of the three rules to the data of the Northern European anglerfish
fishery. Some closing comments and an explanatory appendix conclude the paper.
The Northern European Anglerfish Fishery
The Northern European anglerfish fishery was developed in the mid-70s from the
bycatch of a fleet targeting hake. The fishery lies in the same International Council
for the Exploitation of the Sea (ICES) administrative divisions as the European hake
fishery, which according to the current divisions within the European Atlantic Fish-
eries, divides the fishery into two independent stocks: southern and northern. This
paper focuses on the northern stock, which covers the ICES divisions VII b-k and
VIII a, b, d and e, including western Ireland, the Bay of Biscay, and the Celtic Sea
(see figure 1).
Anglerfish are properly divided into two sub-species, white anglerfish (Lophius
piscatorius) and black anglerfish (Lophius budegasa). The latter has a southern geo-
graphical distribution, extending from Great Britain to Senegal, and lives in waters
up to 500 meters deep, while the white anglerfish has a wider geographical distribu-
tion (extending from the Barents Sea to Spanish waters) and can be found in deeper
waters. Landings of these species during the last six years have been composed of
two-thirds white anglerfish and one-third black anglerfish, although a relative in-
crease in the landings of black anglerfish has been observed over the last two years.
Anglerfish are harvested mainly by an otter trawl fleet, which is the most com-
mon type in French, Spanish, and Irish fleets. Some other gears, such as the beam
trawl and gill nets, are also used, especially in the United Kingdom.
The European hake fishery has, in recent years, suffered from a stock collapse.
This implies that the anglerfish fishery has grown in importance. There has been
both a transfer of fishing effort from hake to anglerfish and a growth in the relative
economic importance of the last species.
From data on harvests for this stock (see table 1) it is evident that seven coun-
tries operate within this fishery: France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Ire-
land, Germany, and the Netherlands. Five of them are relatively important, while
Germany and the Netherlands exploit a smaller proportion of the resource. Table 1
presents the average harvest rates of anglerfish for the periods 1973–78, 1982–85,
and 1986–93. Note that the data for Spain is incomplete since it has only been a
member of the EU since l986.
The European Common Fisheries Policy relies mainly on TAC and quota regula-
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Table 1
Historical Harvest Rates of Anglerfish in Tons and Percentage
Country Average 1973–78 Average 1982–85 Average 1986–93
Belgium 1,760 7% 2,087 8% 927 3%
Germany 203 1% 62 0% 158 1%
Spain (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)
France 16,811 66% 18,717 71% 13,952 50%
Ireland 288 1% 1,522 6% 2,196 8%
The Netherlands 380 1% 180 1% 299 1%
U.K. 4,560 18% 3,941 15% 4,380 16%
TOTAL 25,474 100% 26,509 100% 28,120 100%
Source: ICES (several documents) and FAO statistics.
Figure 1.  Area Studied (including ICES divisions)Gallastegui, Iñarra, and Prellezo 294
important problems that have to be resolved before implementing this policy. The
first is deciding on the size of the TAC, and the second is determining what quotas to
allocate to the different countries exploiting the fishery. The next section explores
these problems in detail.
TAC Determination
The EU first introduced an anglerfish TAC in 1983. This TAC was “precautionary;”
that is, it was based on general knowledge, not on scientific information about the
condition of the stocks within the fishery. This procedure lasted until l993, when a
lower TAC, based on scientific information, was approved.
At this stage, it makes sense to check whether the TACs implemented after 1993
(the analysis of the Northern European anglerfish fishery bankruptcy is carried out
on data post-1993) can be supported by bioeconomic models. The TACs imple-
mented by the EU for the period 1983–99 are reported in tables 2(a) and 2(b). No-
tice that these figures correspond to the sum of white and black anglerfish. On the
other hand, in Prellezo (2000) the optimal harvest estimated for anglerfish is 14,507
tons. This estimation is only for the white stock; hence, it is not possible to make a
direct comparison between them. During the last six years, landings have been com-
posed of two thirds of white anglerfish and one third of black. Thus, it is possible to
conclude that for l993–94 and l995 the established TACs of 23,800 and 23,140 tons,
respectively, were not far from the estimated optimal figure. After l995, this conclu-
sion no longer holds because the TACs are too large.
TAC Distribution
Prior to analyzing the problem of the distribution of the TAC among the countries
involved, two key facets of TAC policymaking and implementation should be con-
sidered. Firstly, it is important to recognize that the EU relies principally on the
Relative Stability Principle. This principle is a cornerstone of the Common Euro-
pean Fisheries Policy and it has a clear political aim: it guarantees each Member
State a fixed percentage of each fish population subject to a TAC policy. Secondly,
when the TAC policy was first implemented by the European Council of Ministers,
the following variables were considered decisive in the calculation of the quotas
corresponding to each member state: (i) the amounts fished by each national fleet
from l973 to 1978; (ii) the requirements and needs of regions whose populations de-
pended in a special manner on fishing activities; (iii) the loss of fishing possibilities
in international waters.
For the case of the Northern European anglerfish fishery, the existence of seven
countries exploiting the resource and stock deterioration led to the application of a
TAC policy. In its implementation, the white and black anglerfish were considered as a
single resource and the quota distribution was made geographically. Tables 2(a) and 2(b)
show the agreed TAC and the assigned quotas for anglerfish from 1980 to 1999.
From tables 2(a) and 2(b), it is evident that France has received the greatest
quota allocation, while the United Kingdom, Belgium, Ireland and Spain have re-
ceived considerably smaller quotas. The last column of each table shows the per-
centage of the quota allocation obtained by each member state in all the periods that
remains fixed. Hence, the Relative Stability Principle has been fulfilled. How these
percentages are derived, however, is worthy of further consideration.Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources 295
Table 2(a)
Agreed TAC and Quotas in Tons and Percentages from 1983 to 1985
Country 1983 1984 1985 % (83, 84, 85 )
Belgium 2,500 2,750 3,060 7
Germany 500 560 630 1
France 23,000 25,930 28,930 66
Ireland 2,500 2,750 3,060 6
The Netherlands 500 560 630 1
U.K. 6,000 7,000 7,810 18
TOTAL 35,000 39,550 44,120 100
Source: Council Regulations. European Commission, DGXIV.
Table 2(b)
Agreed TAC and Quotas in Tons and Percentages from 1986 to 1999
Country 1986–87 1988–92 1993–94 1995 1996 1997–99 % (1986–99)
Belgium 2,780 3,060 1,710 1,660 2,180 2,460 7
Germany 310 340 190 190 240 270 1
Spain 2,460 2,720 1,490 1,440 1,900 2,140 6
France 25,480 28,020 15,460 15,030 19,670 22,290 65
Ireland 2,280 2,510 1,400 1,360 1,790 2,020 6
The Netherlands 360 390 220 220 280 320 1
U.K. 5,410 5,950 3,330 3,240 4,240 4,800 14
TOTAL 39,080 42,990 23,800 23,140 30,300 34,300 100
Source: Council Regulations. European Commission, DGXIV.
1 Curiously, if the Irish’s claims are taken as the amount of the historical catches of Belgium and the rest
of the claims are maintained, the proportional rule replicates the current quotas exactly.
Calculus of the Quotas
The determination of quota allocation has no simple basis. The European Council of
Ministers considers historical fishing rights, the requirements of regions, and the
loss of fishing possibilities in international waters as the variables in calculating the
quotas, but the importance assigned to each variable is not known.
In order to establish whether the EU has utilized the traditional proportional
rule for the distribution of the TAC, it proceeds as follows. The proportion of the
TAC assigned to each country is compared with the proportion between the histori-
cal catches of each country and the sum of all historical catches. From this compari-
son two periods can be clearly distinguished.
For 1983–85 it seems quite clear that if average catches for 1973–78 are used as
a reference point, then the EU did not apply a “strict” proportional rule. The data
suggests that the actual quotas can be better explained by the application of the pro-
portional rule to a context in which the claims of Ireland are greater than their his-
torical catches.1 (Note that Irish fisheries organizations are currently demanding
higher quotas, arguing that the reference period considered was a period of very low
catches for the Irish fleet [COM 2000]).Gallastegui, Iñarra, and Prellezo 296
After 1985, Spain entered the EU with a large fleet, and a share of the TAC had
to be assigned to the newcomer. The rule applied by the EU from l986 onward
seems to be a recalculation of the percentages in a “political” manner. That is, there
has been an adjustment of the percentages so that Spain could get a share of the
TAC. This adjustment was apparently made at the expense of the United Kingdom,
which saw a decrease of four points from its previous share. All these reflections
give rise to the suggestion that the current quotas for anglerfish have been calculated
using a “weighted” proportional rule.
The Fishing Bankruptcy Problem
Table 1 clearly illustrates that in 1993, l994, and l995 the EU confronted what can
be defined as a bankruptcy of the Northern European anglerfish fishery. The agreed
TAC for 1993 and 1994 amounted to 23,800 tons, while the claims (the average
catches for l986–93) amounted to 28,120 tons. In l995, the TAC was set at 23,140
tons, an amount again lower than average catches for the period considered as the
reference point. Total claims were higher than the TAC, and this type of situation
can be characterized as a bankruptcy problem. Formally, this bankruptcy problem
can be formulated in the following way.
Let N = {1,...,n} be a set of countries involved in the distribution of a given
TAC. Each country claims a share of the TAC equivalent to its historical
fishing rights, which are denoted by di ≥  0. The vector of claims against the
TAC is denoted by d = {d1,…,dn}, and the sum of all claims is D = Σ i∈ N di. A
fishing bankruptcy problem emerges when the TAC cannot give away the
summation of the country claims; i.e., Σ i∈ N di > TAC. The pair (TAC, d) is
called a fishing bankruptcy problem, and Bf
N  denotes the set of all fishing
bankruptcy problems with N country claimants.
A division  rule  for a  bankruptcy problem is a function f: Bf
N →   RN,
which assigns to each (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N  a vector f(TAC, d) representing a
distribution of the TAC between countries. Hence, fi(TAC, d) ≥  0 is the
quota assigned to country i. Only efficient division rules are considered;
that is, Σ i∈ N fi(TAC, d) = TAC for all fishing bankruptcy problems.
In this paper, three efficient division rules are considered: the traditional propor-
tional rule, the nucleolus, and the Shapley value. The last two come from coopera-
tive game theory.
The Proportional Rule2
Proportional division was already a favored rule of distribution among philosophers
of ancient Greece, and even now this rule is widely used in distribution problems.
The proportional rule for a fishing bankruptcy problem allocates the TAC propor-
tionally in accordance with the historical rights of the countries, and this seems to
be the principal rule behind the EU distribution of fishing TACs. The formal defini-
tion of this rule is as follows.
The proportional rule for a fishing bankruptcy problem (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N  is:
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The Shapley Value
The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for cooperative games (Shapley
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which implies that the payoff to a player is his average marginal worth to all the
coalitions in which he might participate. For bankruptcy games, the Shapley value can
be easily computed according to the following procedure. Line up the country claimants
in some random order. Then, starting with the first country, give each of them their en-
tire claim until the TAC is exhausted. All orders are equally likely, and the Shapley
value provides each country with the average payment over all possible orders.
Let us illustrate this interpretation with the numerical example used by Young
(1994). Three fishing countries, A, B, and C, have claims of 100, 200, and 300
against a given TAC of 400. There are six possible lineups (table 3). In the ordering
ABC, claimant A withdraws its full claim of 100 from the TAC, then B withdraws its
full claim of 200, and C gets the remaining 100. The amount that each claimant re-
ceives under each ordering is then considered, and the average over the six possible
orderings is 66.6 for A, 116.6 for B, and 216.6 for C, which stands for the Shapley
value solution.
The Nucleolus
As previously noted, there are arguments in favor of rules other than proportional
division. Aumann and Maschler (1985), for instance, argue that if the estate does not
exceed the smallest claim, then equal division among creditors makes good sense. In
this paper, the proposal of Aumann and Maschler that embodies this last idea is con-
Table 3
The Shapley Value
Ordering A B C
ABC 100 200 100
ACB 100 0 300
BAC 100 200 100
BCA 0 200 200
CAB 100 0 300
CBA 0 100 300
Total 400 700 1,300
Average 66.66 116.6 216.66Gallastegui, Iñarra, and Prellezo 298
sidered. They consider the bankruptcy problem as sharing a variable estate among a
set of fixed claimants and propose a division of the estate for each possible case. It
just so happens that their proposal coincides with the nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969).
When applied to bankruptcy problems, the idea behind the nucleolus is that claim-
ants tend to focus on their gains when the TAC to be shared is small, and on their
losses when it is large.
When this solution is presented for a fishing bankruptcy problem, the country
claimants are first ordered so that d1 ≤  … ≤  dn. It will be seen that the nucleolus,
denoted by η , is a solution whose formula varies depending on the relationship be-
tween the sum of claims and the estate. There are four cases. In the first two cases,
the TAC to be distributed is small in relation to the claims (TAC ≤  D/2).
Case 1a: TAC ≤  D/2 and TAC ≤  nd1/2.
In this case, the nucleolus provides each country i with the following quota:
η i TAC d
TAC
n
in (, ) , , , . == … for all 1 (3)
Notice that the TAC is so small in relation to the sum of the claims, TAC ≤  nd1/2,
that the nucleolus divides the TAC equally between the claimants.
Case 1b: TAC ≤  D/2 and TAC ≥  nd1/2.
The TAC in this case is greater than nd1/2, and the nucleolus follows this process of
division: The amount d1/2 is first provided to all countries and country 1 is left with
η 1 = d1/2. The remaining TAC is equally divided between all countries (excluding
country 1) until they obtain d2/2. Country 2 is left with η 2 = d2/2, and again the re-
maining TAC is divided between the countries, excluding countries 1 and 2, until all
of them obtain d3/2 and so on.
In the last two cases, the TAC to be distributed is large in relation to the claims
TAC ≥  D/2.
Case 2a: TAC ≥  D/2 and TAC ≤  (D – nd1/2).
Here, the TAC is not so large, TAC ≤  (D – nd1/2), and the nucleolus for this case
adopts the following process of division: All claimants first receive di/2. At this
time, the first creditor will have the smallest loss, d1/2 (the difference between the
claim and d1/2). The remaining TAC is set aside and used to equalize the losses of
the remaining claimants. The aim is to put each creditor’s loss as close to d1/2 as the
TAC allows. To do this, the following procedure is used: the claimant with the great-
est loss (claimant n) is awarded until its loss equalizes the loss of the n – 1 claimant;
then, the loss of the n and n – 1 claimants is equalized with the loss of the n – 2
claimant and so on, until the TAC is exhausted.
Case 2b: TAC ≥  D/2 and TAC ≥  (D – nd1/2).
In this last case, the TAC is large enough to equalize the loss of all claimants. If
some remains, then it will be equally distributed among all the claimants. This can
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This nucleolus proposal is illustrated below with a numerical example.
Example: Let d1 = 100, d2 = 200 and d3 = 300, and d4 = 400 be the country claim-
ants. With a TAC = 60, Case 1a applies and the nucleolus provides 15 for each coun-
try. With a TAC = 400, Case 1b applies and the nucleolus is η 1 = 50, η 2 = 100, η 3 =
125, η 4 = 125. With a TAC = 700, Case 2a applies and the nucleolus provides η 1 =
50, η 2 = 116.6, η 3 = 216.6, η 4 = 316.6. Finally, with a TAC = 850, Case 2b applies
and the nucleolus is η 1 = 62.5, η 2 = 162.5, η 3 = 262.5, η 4 = 362.5.
Desirable Properties for Division Rules
In this subsection, the discussion moves on to compare the three division rules con-
sidered above according to certain desirable key properties. Of course, some proper-
ties may be desirable in one context and not in another. However, this paper targets
those properties believed by the authors to be relevant to the distribution of a given
TAC between a set of country claimants. The key properties are introduced formally
following Thompson (1995), preceded by a brief explanation of their contents.
No country should receive more than its claim.
This property, called claim boundedness, can be formulated as follows:
For all  (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N  and  i ∈  N, fi(TAC, d) ≤  di.
Two countries with equal claims should be equally awarded.
This property, called symmetry, is formulated as follows:
For all  (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N   and all  i, j ∈  N,  if  di = dj,  then  fi(TAC, d) = fj(TAC, d).
An obvious generalization of symmetry is that the rule should respect the ordering of
claims. If agent i’s claim is at least as large as agent j’s claim, it should receive at least as
much. Here, this property is presented as adapted to the context of the paper.
One country with a greater claim than another should not be awarded a
smaller quota.
The rationality of this property, called order preservation, is obvious: the rule
should respect the ordering of claims. That is, if country i’s claim is greater than
country j’s claim, then the former should receive at least as much as the latter.3
For all (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N   and all  i, j ∈  N, if di > dj,  then  fi(TAC, d) ≥  fj(TAC, d).
Notice that these three properties imply requirements that are so obvious that one
might consider only rules that satisfy them.
3 A stricter version of this property can be formulated. That is, any country with a greater claim than
another should be awarded with a greater payoff.Gallastegui, Iñarra, and Prellezo 300
If the TAC increases no country should receive less.
This property, called net worth monotonicity, is particularly interesting in the con-
text of fisheries regulated via TACs, since the size of each TAC may vary depending
on the biological conditions of the resource. See, for example, the case for the an-
glerfish presented in table 1.4 Formally, let (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N  and TAC′  ∈  R,
if then d TAC TAC f TAC d f TAC d i iN ∈ ∑ > ′ > ′ ≥ ,( , ) ( , ) .
Historical overexploitation should not be rewarded.
Recent biological research has shown that many fish stocks are overexploited and a
quota system may be established in order to rectify this situation. Some quota distri-
bution is principally based on the historic catches of each country claimant,
implying that those countries capturing more in the past are receiving greater quo-
tas. However, are not these countries responsible for the greater part of fish stock
overexploitation? One would presume so. Taking into account this observation, it
seems natural to introduce an additional property that limits the claims of the coun-
tries. The understanding being that claims greater than the TAC will mean that a
country has overexploited the fish stock. This property, called invariance under
claims truncation, is formally defined as follows:
For all  (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
N, f(TAC, d) = f(TAC, dTAC)
where  dTAC = min{TAC, di}.
The minimum rights of countries should be respected.
A country claimant has a minimal right if the difference between the TAC and the
sum of the claims of the remaining countries is positive. The minimum right for
each country is exactly this difference. It seems desirable to select a division rule
that respects these minimum rights. In this case, each country would first receive the
amount defined as its minimum right, and second, the quantity that results of distrib-
uting the remaining amount as in a bankruptcy problem. A numerical example may
clarify the content of this property. Let d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300, and d4 = 400 be
the country claimants. With a TAC = 700, the last country will have 100 as its mini-
mum right. The bankruptcy problem now is transformed into: d1 = 100, d2 = 200,
d3 = 300, and d4 = 300, with a TAC of 600.
Thus, any difficulty in agreement between claimants can be reduced to that part
of the TAC left after the minimum rights have been distributed. This idea is summa-
rized in a property called composition up from minimal rights5 (Thomson 1995), and
it can be defined formally as follows:
For all ( , ) , ( , ) TAC d B f TAC d f
N ∈
=+ [] ∈ ∑ m TAC d f TAC m TAC d d m TAC d i iN i (, ) – (, ) , – (, ) .
4 Once more, a stricter version of this property can be formulated. That is, if the fishing resource in-
creases, every country should receive a greater quota.
5 This property is called v-separability in Dagan (1996).Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources 301
The rule should not be manipulable.
This property, also called strategy-proofness (O’Neill 1982) or non-manipulability
by merging or splitting agents (Chun 1988; De Frutos 1999) implies that no claimant
country should obtain a higher total fishing quota by consolidating its claim with
other country claimants or by splitting its claim into two or more claims. Formally,
it can be stated as follows:
For all  M,T ⊂  N,  all  (TAC, d) ∈ Bf
M   and all  (TAC, d′ ) ∈ Bf
T   if  M ⊂  T
and there is i ∈  M such that   ′ =+ ∈ ′ = ∈ ∑ dd d j M i dd ii j jTM jj \ ,\ { } , and for all
then  f TAC d f TAC d f TAC d ii j jTM (, ) (, ) (, ) . \ ′ =+ ∈ ∑
To conclude this subsection, table 4 shows which of these desirable properties are
satisfied by the three rules defined. See the appendix for formal justifications.
The Bankruptcy Problem of the Northern European Anglerfish Fishery
In this section, the three division rules discussed above are applied to the Northern
European anglerfish fishery. As mentioned previously, the EU has not always faced
a bankruptcy situation in this fishery. In fact from 1983 to 1993, when precautionary
TACs were adopted, they were large enough to allocate quotas that were respectful
with historical catches. However, for the years l993–94 and 1995, the bankruptcy
problem was very evident. In this application, l994 is the focus of analysis to which
the three division rules are applied, on the understanding that the claims of each
country are the average records for the period 1986–93.
The choice of the average records for 1986–93 can be justified on two accounts.
On the one hand, it makes use of historical fishing rights for a period relatively
close to the target year (1994) and on the other, it captures the fact that Spain is also
fishing the resource. On this basis, the bankruptcy problem to be solved is: (TAC 94;
d = average 1986–93).
The fishing quotas obtained for this bankruptcy problem using the proportional
rule, the nucleolus, and the Shapley value are presented in table 5. From this table it
can be seen that there are many differences between the actual distribution and those
obtained by applying the Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the proportional rule.
Considering the ranking of countries in terms of quota size the following obser-
vations can be drawn. First, in 1994 Spain was ranked fourth, whereas it would have
been ranked second if any of the three alternative rules were used. Furthermore, if
the ranking for the 1994 quotas and the theoretical ones are compared, Ireland and
Table 4
Properties of the Quota Division Rules Proposed
Property Proportional Nucleolus Shapley Value
Claim boundedness yes yes yes
Symmetry yes yes yes
Order preserving yes yes yes
Minimal rights no yes yes
Monotonicity yes yes yes
Invariance no yes yes
Manipulability yes no noGallastegui, Iñarra, and Prellezo 302
Belgium swap their positions. Second, if the TAC distribution obtained using the
proportional rule is compared with the TAC distribution obtained from the nucleolus,
it can be seen that France receives more with the latter rule, while the remaining
countries receive less. On the other hand, the Shapley value assigns a greater quota
to France, the Netherlands, and Germany, while the remaining countries obtain
lower amounts. Notice that comparing with the actual quotas, the three rules used in
this exercise give the same ordering for the countries although the differences in the
quantities assigned to each country are not negligible.
Analysis of the Properties of the Northern European Anglerfish Fishery
Now, the desirable properties satisfied by each of the three division rules are analyzed.
The first property, formulated as no country should receive more than its claim, re-
fers to a natural upper bound on the quota and is satisfied by all the division rules.
Table 6 shows the fulfillment of the property for the bankruptcy problem solved.
A second requirement imposed on the division rules is that two or more coun-
tries with equal claims should be awarded equal amounts. This is certainly not the
case in the Northern European anglerfish fishery (all countries have different
claims) but, as shown in Appendix B, all the distribution rules analyzed fulfill this
property. The same occurs for the property formulated as a country with a greater
claim will not be awarded a smaller amount. Table 6 is just an example of how all
the rules analyzed satisfy this property.
The next set of properties refers to upper and lower bounds for fishing quotas.
The first property (a natural upper bound) is that historical overexploitation should
not be rewarded; that is, the rule should not depend on that part of a claim that is
greater than the TAC. To see what this property implies in the quota distribution
problem, let us suppose that the EU, due to the overexploitation of stock, decides to
reduce the TAC for anglerfish to 13,500 tons/year.6 Assume also that the EU assigns
the TAC, taking into account the historical harvest records of the member states for
1986–93. The three distribution rules proposed give the results presented in table 7.
Assuming that no country’s claim can be higher than the TAC, the French claim
will change to 13,500 tons, while the remaining countries, given that their claims
are lower than the TAC, will maintain their full claims. The implementation of the
three divisions rules for this new problem is shown in table 8.
Table 5
TAC Distributions in Tons
Country Proportional Nucleolus Shapley Value 1994 Quotas
France 12,077 13,041 12,805 15,460
Spain 5,552 5,345 5,109 1,490
U.K. 3,442 3,437 3,201 3,330
Ireland 1,571 1,285 1,647 1,400
Belgium 836 463 695 1,710
The Netherlands 204 150 224 220
Germany 117 79 119 190
Note: (TAC 94; d = average 1986–93)
6 This quantity is selected in order to make the illustration easier.Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources 303
Table 8
Solutions for (TAC = 13,500; d = average 1986–93)
France’s claim changes to 13,500
Country Proportional Nucleolus Shapley Value
France 6,583 6,408 6,530
Spain 3,050 3,128 3,101
U.K. 2,120 2,174 2,147
Ireland 1,071 1,098 1,071
Belgium 452 463 437
The Netherlands 146 150 140
Germany 77 79 74
Table 7
Solutions for (TAC = 13,500; d = average 1986–93)
Country Proportional Nucleolus Shapley Value
France 6,694 6,408 6,530
Spain 3,002 3,128 3,101
U.K. 2,086 2,174 2,147
Ireland 1,054 1,098 1,071
Belgium 445 463 437
The Netherlands 143 150 140
Germany 76 79 74
Table 6
Claim Boundedness
Country Proportional Nucleolus Shapley Value Claim
France 12,077 13,041 12,805 13,952
Spain 5,552 5,345 5,109 6,256
U.K. 3,442 3,437 3,201 4,348
Ireland 1,571 1,285 1,647 2,196
Belgium 836 463 695 927
The Netherlands 204 150 224 299
Germany 117 79 119 158
If tables 7 and 8 are compared, it is evident that the quota obtained by each
country using the nucleolus and the Shapley value is exactly the same, while the
proportional rule gives a higher quota to France for the case in which its total claim
is taken into account. The reverse is true for the remaining countries. This implies
that the proportional rule weights positively the entire claim of France, which is
above the TAC, whereas the Shapley value and the nucleolus do not.
The next property refers to a natural lower bound: The minimum rights of the
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bankruptcy problem in two parts. Firstly, the minimum right of each country is com-
puted as explained earlier (see table 9).
Once this minimum right is assigned to each country, a new bankruptcy
problem can be defined. In the new problem, the total amount to be shared is
the initial TAC less the sum of the minimum rights (11,548 tons) and the claims
are the initial ones adjusted downwards by the amounts already obtained. Using
these new claims (d′  in table 9), the new bankruptcy problem is solved. The re-
sults for each rule are shown in the columns (TAC′ , d′ ) of table 10. The three
other columns (Total) of this table show the final amounts when the minimum
rights are added. Comparison of these (Total) columns with the results pre-
sented in table 5 shows that the nucleolus and the Shapley value provide
exactly the same final distribution, respecting the minimum rights property,
while the proportional rule gives a different share.
Finally, the problem of the manipulability of the solutions is analyzed. A
simulation has been conducted under the assumption that all the fishing coun-
tries, except France, consolidate their claims. The results for this case are
shown in table 11.
Comparing tables 11 and 5, it can be seen that the nucleolus and the
Shapley value are manipulable in the sense that all countries, except France,
can obtain a higher share by consolidating their claims. Table 11 also shows
that the proportional rule gives exactly the same results as before.
Table 9













Country (TAC′ , d′ ) Total (TAC′ , d′ ) Total (TAC′ , d′ ) Total
France 3,205 12,821 3,425 13,041 3,189 12,805
Spain 3,205 5,125 3,425 5,345 3,189 5,109
U.K. 3,205 3,217 3,425 3,437 3,189 3,201
Ireland 1,623 1,623 1,285 1,285 1,647 1,647
Belgium 685 685 463 463 695 695
The Netherlands 221 221 150 150 224 224
Germany 116 116 79 79 116 116Bankruptcy of Fishing Resources 305
Closing Comments
Even though fisheries regulated via a TAC policy show, in some cases, the character-
istics that define a bankruptcy problem, the use of these types of models is not
common in the fisheries literature. In fact, to our knowledge, it is the first time that
such an application has been carried out. In this paper, it is shown that the use of
bankruptcy models to characterize a fishery regulated via TAC is a useful approach.
This is made evident from the results obtained with the case study, the Northern Eu-
ropean anglerfish fishery.
First, tables 1, 2(a), and 2(b) show that given the TACs imposed by the EU for
the years l993, 1994, and 1995 (taking as claims the average catches for 1986–93),
the Northern European anglerfish fishery is a bankruptcy problem since total histori-
cal catches were higher than the TAC. Second, data analysis allows us to infer that
the first distribution of the TAC for 1983–85 has been derived by using a sort of a
“weighted” proportional rule. Although the prescribed quotas for France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium, when the average catches for the
period 1973–78 are taken as the reference point, approximate to the outcome given
by the proportional rule, this is not the case for Ireland, which was treated differ-
ently. Moreover, the rule followed from l986 (once Spain entered the EU) onwards
can be considered as a modification of the “weighted” proportional rule previously
used. That is, the EU adjusted the quotas so that Spain could get a part of the TAC.
This adjustment was made at the expense of the United Kingdom. Third, the divi-
sion rules considered in this exercise were the proportional rule, the Shapley value,
and the nucleolus. As expected, these rules are sensitive to the definition of the
claims and give quite different outcomes.
Finally, the behavior of the division rules in relation to a set of desirable key
properties has been illustrated. All of the rules considered satisfy the obvious re-
quirements of claim boundedness, symmetry, and order preservation. However, the
property historical overexploitation should not be rewarded, discriminates between
the rules. While the Shapley value and the nucleolus satisfy it, the proportional rule
does not. The same happens with the minimum rights property. The question of the
manipulability of the solutions has been also analyzed, revealing that only the pro-
portional rule is not manipulable.
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Appendix
The purpose of this rather technical appendix is to provide some theoretical results
and references that exist in the literature of cooperative games. These results are
concerned with the verification by the proportional rule, the Shapley value, and the
nucleolus of the properties that are considered desirable. See Thompson (1995) for a
survey of the literature devoted to the axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems.
In order to formally justify the mentioned verification, it is necessary to formu-
late a bankruptcy problem as a game in a characteristic function form, since this
type of modeling shows whether the Shapley value and the nucleolus satisfy the set
of desirable properties.
Following O’Neill (1982) a bankruptcy problem is a pair (E, d) where E is the
estate and d is the vector of claimants. This problem can be defined as an n-person
cooperative game (N, v), where N is the set of claimants and the characteristic func-
tion is defined as:
vS E d N S S N B( ) max , ( – ) , =− {} ⊆ 0 for all
where  dN S d i iNS () . \ −= ∈ ∑
In other words, the worth of a coalition S, denoted by vB(S), represents the maxi-
mum amount that coalition S can get by accepting either nothing, or what is left of E
after paying the claim of the members outside its coalition. It is well known that aBankruptcy of Fishing Resources 307
bankruptcy cooperative game is convex. Now, let us present the results concerned
with the verification of the properties by the proportional rule, the Shapley value
and the nucleolus:
Claim boundedness: Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987) have proved that a division
rule for a bankruptcy problem selects a core allocation if, and only if, it satisfies
claim boundedness. Given that the nucleolus always provides a core allocation (see
Schmeidler 1969) and that the Shapley value of a convex game is also a core alloca-
tion (see Shapley 1971), both solutions must satisfy claim boundedness.
Additionally, in the same paper, it has also been proven that the proportional rule
(proportional to the claims) in a bankruptcy problem satisfies claim boundedness.
Therefore, the three division rules satisfy claim boundedness.
Symmetry and order preservation: It is easy to see how the proportional rule satis-
fies symmetry. Moreover, for the case of the Shapley value and the nucleolus, these
solutions have been “characterized” using this property by Shapley (1953) and
Schmeidler (1969), respectively. (Notice that if a solution is characterized using a prop-
erty, then this solution satisfies this property.) On the other hand, from the application
of the Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the proportional rule to any bankruptcy
problem, it is clear that all three satisfy the property of order preservation.7
Monotonicity: Young (1985) has proven that the Shapley value satisfies net worth
monotonicity. Besides, considering the four-case procedure that defines the nucleolus
for a bankruptcy problem, it is easy to see that this solution satisfies this property.8 It is
also immediate that the proportional rule satisfies net worth monotonicity.
Invariance under claims truncation: In order to see how the nucleolus and the Shapley
value satisfy this property, let us proceed as follows. For any bankruptcy problem with
claims greater than the TAC, it is possible to consider a new associated bankruptcy prob-
lem in which these “claims” have been substituted exactly by the TAC. The two
problems, if different, give the same cooperative game. Hence, the nucleolus and the
Shapley value will provide the same outcome for the two problems, implying that they
are invariant under claims truncation. Additionally, in the main text there are examples
that illustrate that the proportional rule does not satisfy this property (see tables 7 and 8).
Composition up from minimum rights: In Dagan (1996) it can be seen how any rule
that is invariant under claims truncation and self-dual9 will satisfy composition up
from minimum rights. The nucleolus and the Shapley value satisfy both properties;
hence, they will also satisfy composition up from minimum rights. In contrast, the
application given in the main text shows an example of how the proportional rule
does not satisfy this property (table 10).
Manipulability: O’Neill (1982), Chun (1988) and de Frutos (1999) have shown that
the proportional rule is the only non-manipulable rule. Therefore, the nucleolus and
the Shapley value cannot satisfy this property.
7 Note that the Shapley value and the nucleolus do not satisfy strict order preserving, as can be seen in
the following example: Let d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300, and E = 100. In this case, both the Shapley
value and the nucleolus give the same payment to all claimants, Shi = η i = 33.3 for i = 1,2,3. On the
other hand, it is easy to see how the proportional rule satisfies strict order preserving.
8 Note that the Shapley value and the nucleolus do not satisfy strict monotonicity, as can be seen in the
following example: Let d1 = 100, d2 = 200, d3 = 300. It is easy to check that claimant d1 receives the
same payment if E = 400 or if E = 450 using both the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
9 A self dual rule implies that awards and losses in the nucleolus are allocated in the same manner. See
Dagan (1996) for a formal statement of this property.